Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence
OUTLINE
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks
I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.
贵州省农村水利劳动积累办法
贵州省水利厅
贵州省农村水利劳动积累办法
贵州省水利厅
第一条 为搞好水利建设，改善农业生产条件，增强农业后劲，根据国家有关方针政策和《贵州省农田水利工程管理暂行规定》，制定本办法。
第二条 本着合理负担，量力适度的原则，每个农村劳动力每年投入农村水利的劳动积累工，一般为10到20个。
第三条 农村水利的劳动积累工，主要用于县、乡范围内的防洪、排水、灌溉、供水等工程的清淤补漏、水毁修复、除险加固、防渗配套、更新改造以及新建农村水利工程和水土流失治理工程。
汛期抢险、农民承包土地范围内的土地平整、田间沟渠的整修，不得使用农村水利劳动积累工。
第四条 属于社会效益的防洪、除涝、供水和改善生态环境的工程，受益区内的城镇居民和单位职工，要承担一定的义务工。
第五条 农村水利劳动积累工的筹集和分配：
（一）根据农村水利建设任务和受益情况，本着“谁受益，谁出工”的原则，按比例合理分配到户，不愿出工者，可以资代工。以资代工的有关办法，由县级人民政府制定或由受益区群众议定。
（二）在分配农村水利劳动积累工时，对军烈属、老、弱、残以及其它有特殊困难的劳动力，应予照顾或豁免。
（三）对于用工较多的农村水利工程，可以采取以工换工或以资换工的办法，在自愿的基础上，与非受益区群众签订协作合同。
第六条 各类现有农村水利工程的清淤补漏及维修，全部由受益区群众负担。各类农村水利工程的劳动积累工数量，原则上按下列各项规定办理。
（一）小（二）型（含以上现有灌溉工程的配套和更新改造，按灌溉面积的大小计算投工：新增一亩投工10到15个；改善一亩投工5到10个、小（二）型（含）以上新建工程，灌溉一亩投工15到20个，主要用于工程枢纽及干渠建设。小（二）型以下工程，不论新建或现有灌
溉工程的配套和更新改造，原则上由受益区群众投劳集资解决，国家可以补助部分材料费。
（二）农村人畜饮水工程的建设，按受益人数计算投工，原则上由受益者投劳集资解决，国家只补助部分材料费。
（三）除险工程（灌浆部分除外），按灌溉面积或工程量大小计算投工，一般每亩投工不少于5到10个。
（四）防洪排涝工程，保护一亩农田投工10到15个，保护一人投工5个。
第七条 农村水利劳动积累工的使用和管理。
（一）农村水利劳动积累工，由县、乡两级政府负责组织和管理，县、区水利部门负责使用。县水利部门在制定农村水利工程年度计划时，要提出使用农村水利劳动积累工的工程项目、用工数量、用工时间和用工计划，报县级人民政府审批后下达执行。
（二）使用农村水利劳动积累工，可采取以乡或村为单位，任务到户到劳等办法。但要明确投工地段，规定完工时间和验收标准。工程完成后，要统一组织验收。各地也可按工折款集资，实行招标承包施工。
（三）建立农村水利劳动积累工清工结帐制度。县、区、乡、村要设立台帐；农户使用农村水利劳动积累手册，由村干部据实登记，作为农户清工结帐的依据。农村水利劳动积累工，要做到当年用工，当年结清，未按规定完成投工的，可以资代工。
第八条 农村水利劳动积累按数量和质量进行考核，由县水利部门根据当地情况，制定劳动定额考核标准。
第九条 县级人民政府应加强对农村水利劳动积累工作的领导，经常检查劳动积累工的完成、使用等情况。水利部门要合理安排、使用好农村水利劳动积累工。
第十条 县级人民政府可根据本办法制定实施细则。
第十一条 省及省以下各级人民政府过去有关规定与本办法不符的，以本办法为准。
第十二条 本办法自发布之日起施行。
1988年1月10日
